业绩预告信息对分析师预测行为有影响吗  

Does Earnings Preannouncement Information Impose Effects on the Forecast Behavior of Financial Analysts?

作　　者：王玉涛[1] 王彦超[1] 

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学会计学院,北京100081

出　　处：《金融研究》2012年第6期193-206,共14页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(批准号:71102124);中央财经大学"211工程"重点学科建设项目;北京市教育委员会共建项目的资助

摘　　要：本文考察了业绩预告披露的形式、精度等特征对分析师跟踪数量、预测误差和预测分歧度的影响,实证结果发现:相对于定性业绩预告,发布定量业绩预告的公司以及闭区间宽度较小的公司其跟踪的分析师数量较多,预测误差和分歧度也较低。这些结果意味着,作为一个重要的信息来源,上市公司业绩预告的形式和质量显著影响了分析师的预测行为。研究结论不仅有助于监管部门了解业绩预告政策对资本市场参与者的现实影响,而且也为业绩预告是否影响投资者行为的相关研究提供了新的经验证据。This paper investigates the effects of earnings preannouncement characteristics, such as form and pre- cision, on analysts＇ following, forecast error and forecast dispersion. The research evidence shows that com- pared with the ones reporting qualitative earnings preannouncement, the companies reporting quantitative and smaller width of earnings preannouncernent are followed by more analysts. Moreover, the forecast error and dis- persion of the latter are smaller than the former. The empirical evidence implies the form and quality of earnings preannouncement affect the forecast behavior of analysts significantly. This paper not only helps the supervisor understand the real effects of earnings preannouncement policies on capital market participants, but also pro- vides the new empirical evidence for the related literature of investors＇ behaviors.

关 键 词：业绩预告 分析师预测 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]