地方政府干预、控制权接管与特别处理制度实施效果  

Study on the Implementation Effect of Local Governance Intervene,Market for Corporate Control Special Treatment

作　　者：朱滔[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学金融研究所 [2]暨南大学金融系,广东广州510632

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2012年第6期1-8,共8页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(项目编号:71102041);广东省哲学社会科学“十一五”规划项目(项目编号:GD10YYJ10);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(项目编号:11JYB2016)

摘　　要：通过对特别处理制度实施的实际效果及影响因素进行研究,发现特别处理制度可以通过两条途径发挥治理作用:一是对大股东的治理,即接管ST公司的控制权;二是对高管的治理,即变更高管或对现任高管施加压力。在这两条途径中,接管控制权是特别处理制度发挥治理作用的主要途径,而地方政府干预显著降低了公司被接管的可能性。The paper focuses on the implementation effect of special treatment in China. The paper identifies two ways that the special treatment can improve the quality of the listed firms. One is takeover threats to the controlling shareholder, and the other is turnover threats to the incumbent managers. Theoretical analysis projects that the dominate way that special treatment can improve the quality of the listed firms is takeover threats to the controlling shareholder rather than turnover threats to the managers. Local govern- ment intervention weakens the positive effect of special treatment since local government intervention reduces the odds of ST finns be- ing acquired.

关 键 词：特别处理 接管 政府干预 控制权市场 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]