机构投资者持股动机的双重性与企业真实盈余管理  

Double-Incentives Based Institutional Stock Holdings and Real Earning Management in Chinese Listed Firms

作　　者：孙刚[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]宁波工程学院经济与管理学院,浙江宁波315211 [2]上海财经大学会计学院,上海200439

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2012年第6期114-124,共11页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(70972060);浙江省教育厅科研项目(Y201010040);上海财经大学研究生创新基金项目(CXJJ-2011-204);宁波工程学院人文社科基金项目(2011210)

摘　　要：以上市企业真实盈余管理作为研究切入点,系统检验了机构投资者持股受限与企业真实盈余管理幅度的关系。研究发现,交易动机较强的机构投资者持股比例与被投资企业真实盈余管理幅度呈显著的正相关关系,并且机构投资者持股未显著降低企业真实盈余操控行为发生的概率;监督动机较强的机构投资者持股比例与被投资企业真实盈余管理幅度和发生概率呈显著的负相关关系,并且机构投资者所持受限流通股比例与企业应计项目管理和真实盈余管理幅度均呈显著的负相关关系。较之于监督动机较强的机构投资者,交易动机较强的机构投资者持股较多的企业信息风险更高,也倾向于持有更多的现金资产来满足其流动性需求。这为研究我国股票市场中具有双重动机的机构投资者持股对企业实际经营活动的影响提供了初步证据。Based on real earning management behavior （REM）of listed firms, the paper examines the relationship between dou- ble incentives based institutional stock holdings. The findings indicate that in firms held mainly by institutional investors with strong trading incentive, institutional stock holdings are significantly positively associated with REM, and institutional holdings do not signifi- cantly decrease the probability of REM. However, in firms held mainly by institutional investors with strong monitoring incentives, in- stitutional stock holdings are significantly negatively related with the level and probability of REM. Furthermore, the more restricted A shares held by institutional investors, the less accrual manipulation and REM. For Robustness, The paper also finds that compared to firms held by institutions mainly for monitoring incentive, the firms held more by institutions with strong trading incentives hold more cash for precautionary purpose. The paper provides preliminary evidences of economic consequence of double-incentives institutional holdings on REM.

关 键 词：机构投资者持股 双重动机 真实盈余管理 应计项目操控 

分 类 号：F23[经济管理—会计学]