混合供给模式下巨灾保险市场的激励与约束研究  

The Research on Incentives and Constraints of the Catastrophe Insurance Market under the Mixed Supply Mode

作　　者：高海霞[1] 王学冉[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学保险学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《保险研究》2012年第6期83-88,共6页Insurance Studies

摘　　要：巨灾保险具有准公共物品属性,既可以由政府提供,也可以由市场提供,单纯依靠政府和私人市场提供都存在较大弊端,政府和私人部门合作,采用混合供给模式可以形成互补优势,提高效率,这已成为国际巨灾保险市场发展的一大趋势。本文以混合供给模式下的巨灾保险市场为对象,分析巨灾保险市场中的委托代理关系,并对如何构建有效的激励与约束机制进行了初步探讨。Catastrophe insurance has the properties of quasi-public goods. It can be provided by the government or by the market. However,there exists large drawbacks if relying solely on government or private market. The major develop- ment trend in the international catastrophe insurance market is to adopt the mixed supply model of government and pri- vate sector cooperation which can combine complementary strengths of each party and improve eMciency. This paper ana- lyzed the principal-agent relationship in the catastrophic insurance market under the mixed supply model, and also dis- cussed how to build an effective incentive and restriction mechanism.

关 键 词：巨灾保险市场 混合供给模式 委托代理问题 激励与约束 

分 类 号：F840.32[经济管理—保险]