活跃连接下两个水平上的合作进化  

EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION BY TWO-LEVEL SELECTION UNDER ACTIVE LINKING

作　　者：李玉英[1] 刘心声[1] 李夏飞[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学高新技术研究院理学院,南京210016

出　　处：《南京大学学报（数学半年刊）》2012年第1期66-74,共9页Journal of Nanjing University(Mathematical Biquarterly)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(10971097;10732040);国家973计划(2007CB936204)

摘　　要：本文研究活跃链接下两个水平(即组选择)的合作进化动态.给出了弱选择下策略的固定概率及策略更有优势的条件.然后以囚徒困境为例讨论了促进合作行为进化的条件,即如果支付收益比与总体内组数、组容量及各策略间接触率满足一定的不等式,则有利于合作行为的进化.最后,本文对模型进行了数值模拟,结果表明,本文模型可以有效促进合作行为的进化.This paper studies evolutionary dynamics of cooperation by two-level selection under active linking. We give the fixation probability of each strategy under weak selection and the conditions of strategy abundance. We derive the conditions for the evolution of cooperation by group selection in Prisoner＇s dilemma game. That is, if a certain inequality involving cost-to-benefit ratio, the number of group, maximum group size and the fractions of active links is satisfied, group selection favors cooperation. Some numerical simulations are presented, and the results show that the model can facilitate cooperative behavior effectively.

关 键 词：Moran过程 活跃链接 组选择 固定概率 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]