港口岸线资源使用许可拍卖模型  

An auction model for port shoreline resources licence

作　　者：黄莺[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海海事大学交通运输学院,上海201306

出　　处：《上海海事大学学报》2012年第2期65-68,共4页Journal of Shanghai Maritime University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(11CGL077);上海海事大学校基金(20110059)

摘　　要：为揭示我国港口岸线资源的真实价值,运用拍卖模型和博弈理论,论证英式拍卖与一级密封价格拍卖模式对港口岸线资源使用许可证拍卖的适用性和有效性,分析不同拍卖模式下的投标者最优报价策略和政府期望利润,建立港口岸线资源使用许可拍卖模型,并进行数值仿真.结果表明:对于政府而言,英式拍卖与一级密封式拍卖能带来同等的期望利润,拍卖人数较多情况下,各拍卖者在一级密封价格拍卖过程中报价无限接近其真实报价;对于投标人而言,相较于英式拍卖,一级密封价格拍卖能产生一定预期收益,因此投标人更倾向于一级密封价格拍卖模式.In order to reveal the real valuation of port shoreline resources, auction model and game theory are used to certify the applicability and effectiveness of English auction and first-price sealed auction for licence of port shoreline resources, and the optimal bidding strategy and government expected profits un- der different auction modes are analyzed. An auction model for port shoreline resources licence is built, and the numerical simulation is conducted. The results show： for government, the expected profits from English auction and first-price sealed auction are equal and the bidding prices of each bidder in first- sealed price auction infinitely approach their real estimates when the number of bidders is large; for bid- ders, the first-price sealed auction could generate more expected profits than English auction, so the first- price sealed auction style would be preferred by bidders.

关 键 词：港口岸线资源 英式拍卖 一级密封价格拍卖 许可 博弈 

分 类 号：U691.1[交通运输工程—港口、海岸及近海工程] F830.9[交通运输工程—船舶与海洋工程]