需求模糊且依赖价格的收益共享契约  

Revenue sharing contracts of price-depended fuzzy demand

作　　者：张雁[1] 赵明[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽交通职业技术学院管理工程系,安徽合肥230051

出　　处：《佛山科学技术学院学报（自然科学版）》2012年第3期26-30,共5页Journal of Foshan University(Natural Science Edition)

摘　　要：在需求是模糊变量且依赖价格的假设下,研究了由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的供应链协作问题。首先,运用可信性理论,分别讨论了在分散决策下供应链双方的Stackelberg博弈,以及供应链一体化决策,并说明分散决策的最优解不能实现供应链系统的最优;其次,建立了基于收益共享契约的数学模型,研究结果表明,协调机制与集中决策具有相同的最优零售价格,并且两个契约参数——批发价格和收益分配系数是负相关的;最后,给出了供应链能够完美协调的充分条件以及收益分配系数的合理范围。With the supposition that any demand is fuzzy and price-depended, we discuss the cooperation between a supplier and a retailer who form a supply chain. By using the credibility theory, we not only explicate the Stackelberg game and the integration decision between the supplier and the retailer respectively, which results in the conclusion that the optimal solutions under the decentralized decision cannot optimize the supply chain, but also build the mathematic model based on the revenue sharing contract. We find that the coordinated mechanism and the centralized decision share the same optimal retail price while the two relevant coefficients, the wholesale price and the profit distribution, have a negative relation. We suggest the sufficient condition for the perfect coordination of the supply chain and a reasonable range of the profit distribution coefficient.

关 键 词：模糊变量 可信性理论 收益共享 供应链协调 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]