基于技术标准的技术进步策略选择——一个进化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis Underlying the Strategic Choice of Technology Progress Based on Technology Standard

作　　者：曹群[1] 刘任重[2] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨商业大学经济学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150028 [2]哈尔滨商业大学金融学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150028

出　　处：《经济管理》2012年第7期154-162,共9页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目"从技术标准引进到自主创新的进化机理研究"(09YJC790063);黑龙江省普通高等学校青年学术骨干支持计划"电信产业技术标准产品扩散模型及其应用研究"(1251G026);黑龙江省自然科学基金项目"黑龙江省县域中小企业集群化发展问题研究"(G201128)

摘　　要：生产方式的巨大变革使得国家之间的竞争转变为对行业主导权的争夺和市场利益的分割。技术标准因其具有的网络效应和巨大的外部性,使得其成为国家之间竞争的焦点。但是,在技术标准主导权的争夺中,技术后发国家因为其存在的各种瓶颈资源的限制,使得其在技术标准领域始终处于被动的技术引进位置。多代际的技术标准使得技术后发国家要付出巨额的专利使用费。技术后发国家能否通过技术标准的自主创新摆脱被动地位,尽快完成技术追赶,论证其合理性和必然性是本文研究的核心命题。本文系统总结和梳理国内外文献,在经济主体有限理性的前提下,将博弈群体分为技术早发国家和技术后发国家,通过构建进化博弈模型,以及技术早发国家和技术后发国家之间的博弈支付矩阵,运用复制动态方程分析和雅可比矩阵判断法,分析这两类群体技术进步策略选择的动态趋势,并求出两类博弈群体均以一定概率选择技术标准的自主创新策略为该模型的进化稳定策略,并论证其合理性。再根据成本收益分析,证明在集中高技术专利的技术标准的竞争中,技术后发国家选择技术标准的自主创新策略以避免路径依赖必然性。Tech-standards are the technical criteria designed for the proceedings which needs unified coordination in technical activities, and a unified definition for the repetitive technical proceedings. In the industrial society, the decrease in transaction costs, improvement in economies of scale and resulting material increase in production efficiency can be attributable to the public good property and exchangeable standardized parts and components based on tech-standards. With the advent of knowledge-oriented era and rapid development of science and technology, production technology is becoming immensely complicated and concentrated. Tech-standards become the major approach to the systematicality and integration of the high and new-technology. Meanwhile, with constant improvement in the modem system of intellectual property, patented technologies contribute an increasingly larger share to standards, which leads to the emergence of, as Shapiro put, Patents Thicket, and enhances the exclusivity of techstandards. The exclusivity of tech-standards, combined with their strong network effects and path dependence, means whoever seizes the leadership in tech-standards dominates the markets and takes a lion＇s share of the commercial profits. Consequently, the tech-standards R＆D attracts the top attention of the world. However, technically strong and well financed developed countries have long been dominating the R＆D, technology transfer and diffusion due to the substantial costs and high risks related to the development of high and advanced technologies in the process of teeh-standards R＆D. The developing countries, however, constrained by development conditions, economic strength and bottleneck resources, are put in a backward position and incur high patent royalty. Can developing countries rely exclusively on tech-standard introduction？ This is a subject which deserves our concern and study. This article approaches to this subject via evolutionary game theory. In this paper, we get the conclusion that the some ra

关 键 词：进化稳定策略 技术进步 技术标准 博弈分析 自主创新策略 后发国家 有限理性 复制动态方程 

分 类 号：F062.4[经济管理—政治经济学]