转轨经济中行业性行政垄断的制度根源——基于理性政府汲税约束视角  

The Cause of Industry Administrative Monopoly in Transition Economy: Based on the Perspective of Rational Government's Tax Restraint Hypothesis

作　　者：姜琪[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学经济学院

出　　处：《经济评论》2012年第4期15-22,共8页Economic Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"转轨经济条件下网络型产业竞争政策研究"(项目编号:70973066)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：有关行业性行政垄断制度根源的研究大多局限于利益集团理论框架内,忽视了对政府本质和行为的深层次分析。本文提出理性政府假设,并基于理性政府的汲税约束视角,构建政府税收约束函数和政府效用函数的相应模型,对行政垄断的制度根源进行新的探讨。研究表明,理性政府为了维护自己的执政地位和国家的长治久安,对经济和行政两种汲税手段可相机抉择使用;政府税收的最优点会偏离经济效率的最优点,政府通过突破税收约束的途径来实现自身效用最大化会导致对经济的过度干预;在既定税收水平的条件下,通过改变制度组合,使政府税收最大化点向经济效率最大化点移动,是政府效用提高的另一途径,该途径的实现依赖于政府转型——建设强化市场型政府。The research about administrative monopoly regime is confined to the interest group theory framework, and ignores deep analysis on the nature and behavior of government. This article puts forward rational government hypothesis. Based on the perspective that rational government described the tax restrain, by constructing a government tax choice of the utility function and the corresponding model, this article discusses the regime of administrative monopoly. The research shows that, rational government aims to protect their ruling position and long - term stability of the country, therefore they can make a choice between economic efficiency and administrative efficiency. The tax utility optimal solution inevitably deviates from the optimal solution of economic efficiency. The government＇ s pattern to realize their utility maximization through breaking the tax restrain will lead to excessive intervention economy. Under the condition of tax horizontal restrain, altering the combination of regime will help the government improve utility. This way makes the maximum point of government tax coming near to the maximum point of economic efficiency. The motivation of government altering combination of regime comes from market - augmenting government.

关 键 词：行政垄断 制度根源 理性政府 汲税约束 

分 类 号：F124[经济管理—世界经济] F812.42