Actual implementation of spectrum-sharing systems in rayleigh fading channels~  

作　　者：裴二荣 Wang Sheng Zhang Zhizhong 

机构地区：[1]School of Communication and Information Engineering,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu,611731,P.R.China [2]School of Communication and Information Engineering,Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Chongqing,400065,P.R.China.

出　　处：《High Technology Letters》2012年第2期145-150,共6页高技术通讯（英文版）

基　　金：Supported by the National Basic Research Program of China （2007CB307104）, the National Natural Science Foundation of China （60973160）, and the Intematiortal Scientific and Technological Cooperation Program （No. $2010GR0902）.

摘　　要：In actual implementation of spectrum sharing systems, due to the selfishness of primary users, primary users often refuse the access of secondary users to their licensed spectrum bands even if the access of secondary users doesn＇t affect their transmission. Aimed at the selfishness problem of primary users, a seller＇s market trading mechanism is introduced which can not only stimulate primary users to tolerate larger interference power but also give the primary users an appropriate compensation at the same time, and which has very important practical significance. Based on the mechanism, the achievable maximal gross profit of secondary users and their optimal power allocation scheme in the Rayleigh fading environment are derived, and the interference price of primary users and the average revenue of secondary users＇ impact on them are also studied. Numerical calculation results are conducted to verify our theoretical results.

关 键 词：cognitive radio spectrum sharing power allocation seller＇s market trading mechanism CONVEXOPTIMIZATION 

分 类 号：TP334[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构] TN911.22[自动化与计算机技术—计算机科学与技术]