基于伯特兰德均衡和智猪博弈的寡头景区竞合策略研究  

Competition and Cooperation of Scenic Areas in Oligopoly: A Perspective of Bertrand Equilibrium and Boxed Pigs Game

作　　者：罗浩[1] 陈浩[2] 曹靖[3] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院,广东广州510275 [2]中山大学旅游发展与规划中心,广东广州510275 [3]广州市城市规划勘测设计研究院,广东广州510060

出　　处：《地理科学》2012年第7期784-789,共6页Scientia Geographica Sinica

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(41171112)资助

摘　　要：近些年来,旅游地之间的竞争与合作一直是旅游研究的热点问题。从博弈论的角度切入,通过建立伯特兰德模型,分析在寡头垄断环境下景区的竞争策略,确定均衡条件下的最优门票价格;通过引入"智猪博弈"模型,以旅游基础设施投资为例,分析了几种不同情况下景区间的合作关系,提出在景区实力较悬殊的情况下,小景区存在通过搭便车增加自身游客量的方法;而在其他几种情况中,景区间可能分摊投资费用或者都不愿投资;最后,通过对阿坝和皖南两个案例的讨论,初步验证了提出的理论观点。Competition and cooperation of tourism destinations have been widely discussed for both academics and tourism practitioners. This article aims to examine the competition and cooperation relationship of oligopo- ly scenic areas from a game theory perspective. In particular, Bertrand model is firstly employed to analyze the competitive strategy of scenic areas under oligopoly environment, and the optimal ticket price under equilibri- um is further identified. Secondly, boxed pigs game model is introduced to examine the cooperation of scenic areas for infrastructure investment under different scenarios. The results indicate that under the scenario that significant difference exists in the competitive power of scenic areas, the scenic areas with less competitive power are capable of increasing their tourist arrivals by free riding, whereas for other scenarios, all scenic areas involved either prefer to share the investment cost together or be not willing to invest at all. Finally, the theoret- ical conclusions are verified by the analysis on the two cases of Ngawa and the Southern Anhui in China. Here the Game theory is introduced to market behavior analysis of tourist attraction. Based on Bertrand equilibrium and boxed pigs game model, this artcile discusses the competition and cooperation of scenic areas under differ- ent scenarios. The results indicates that when the competitive powers among scenic areas are significantly dif- ferent, then in the short term, the best competitive strategy for the scenic areas with less competitive power is to follow the prices established by the scenic areas with greater competitive powers. In the long term, tourist ar- eas with less competitive power could improve themselves by promoting their brands, emphasizing the product difference, and being a free rider regarding with investing in infrastructure construction and promoting in po- tential tourist source markets. As for two scenic areas with similar competitive powers, they could enhance their competitive advantages by cooperat

关 键 词：寡头景区 竞合策略 伯特兰德均衡 智猪博弈 

分 类 号：F063.1[经济管理—政治经济学]