地方政府与企业在节能减排政策执行中的博弈分析  

On the Game Analysis of Local Government and Enterprises in the Process of Implementing Energy Reduction Policy

作　　者：宁国良[1] 罗立[1] 

机构地区：[1]湘潭大学公共管理学院,湖南湘潭411105

出　　处：《湘潭大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2012年第4期12-15,共4页Journal of Xiangtan University:Philosophy And Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"和谐社会构建中的地方政府政策执行力研究"(编号:07BZZ018)阶段性成果

摘　　要：在节能减排政策执行过程中,由于地方政府与企业之间利益倾向不同,存在信息不对称,政企关系向契约化和交易化方向发展,从而导致节能减排政策执行的变形走样。这些现象本质上是各种利益主体的利益博弈问题。从博弈论的视角来分析企业和地方政府的行为,建构政府与企业在节能减排政策执行中的博弈模型,设计相关参数,可以发现节能减排政策执行力不强的关键环节和原因,从而寻求相应的解决措施。In the process of implementing energy redaction policies, as the information asymmetry between the local governments and enterprises grows, which lead to in a contract and trade way governments - enterprises relations develop and the tendency of the interests of both sides varies, which lead to the change of the implementation of energy reduction comes into being. However, these phenomena are essentially the interests of all stakeholders game. We can see the deficiency in the process of implementing energy policies by analyze the behavior of enterprises and local governments from the perspective of game theory. And then, looks for a valid path to improve energy conservation implementation capacity by constructing the game, designing associative pararaetrie and probing the methods to solve these problems.

关 键 词：地方政府 企业 节能减排 政策执行 博弈模型 

分 类 号：D630.1[政治法律—政治学]