“一行三会”监管协调机制的有效性问题  

On the Effectiveness of the Coordination Mechanisms of Financial Supervision in China

作　　者：于永宁[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学应用经济学博士后流动站 [2]山东大学法学院

出　　处：《山东大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2012年第4期54-58,共5页Journal of Shandong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社科基金项目“民生视野下适当生活水准权的法律保障”(项目编号11CFX031);山东省软科学项目“山东省省级创业投资引导基金的规范运作与监督管理”(项目编号2011RKGA5009);山东省博士后创新项目“山东省区域性多层次资本市场的建设与法律环境研究”(项目编号201103057);山东大学自主创新基金“金融监管法律体系的改革与重塑”(项目编号2010GN023)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：目前,"一行三会"监管协调机制面临的问题,表现在不能实现对风险的监管全覆盖、协调机制法律效力低下、信息互通机制没有建立等方面。究其根源,在于国家所有权导致的监管权能不平等和监管目标失衡,以及国家行政级别导致的监管独立性缺失和监管执行力下降。我们可以通过明确监管协调机制的监管目标和确定人民银行在监管协调机制中的领导者地位来提高金融监管效率。The People＇s Bank of China （PBC）, China Banking ties Regulatory Commission （CSRC） and China Insurance Regulat Regulatory Commission （CBRC）, China Securi- ory Commission （CIRC） are the financial market supervisors in China, authorized by law to exercise their respective regulatory and management functions and to es- tablish the coordination mechanisms of financial supervision. There are some issues with the current coordination mechanisms, including the failure to achieve full coverage of risk regulation, low legal effectiveness of the coordi- nation mechanisms and the absence of the information sharing mechanism. The root causes for these issues include unequal regulatory functions and the imbalance in target supervision associated with state ownership, the lack of regulatory independence and poor enforcement due to the government administrative strata. This article argues that regulatory effectiveness could be improved by clearly defining the regulatory objectives and establishing the leading role of PBC in the coordination mechanisms.

关 键 词：一行三会监管协调机制金融监管 

分 类 号：F832.1[经济管理—金融学]