存款保险制度:道德风险及定价策略——国外文献综合述评  

Deposit Insurance Institution:Moral Hazard and Pricing Strategy

作　　者：陈建华[1] 张显球[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行人事教育司,北京100037 [2]中国人民银行会计司,北京100800

出　　处：《金融研究》2000年第5期113-117,共5页Journal of Financial Research

摘　　要：本文着重考虑存款保险制度的两个方面 :道德风险问题和以风险为基础的定价问题 ,其中将特别考虑市场不完全的现实情况。其结论包括三个方面 :1 通过实施一种以风险为基础的定价规则 ,从而确实能够为道德风险难题提供出一种有效的解决办法 ;2 当存在不对称信息时 ,由于时间问题和逆向选择问题的影响 ,公正地对存款保险进行定价是不可能的 ;3 作为存款保险制度的一种结果 ,银行之间的竞争将更趋激烈 ,这无疑增加了银行失败的预期成本。Take the reality of market incompleteness into consideration,the objective of this article is to illustrate the two aspects of the deposit insurance institution,that is,the issue of moral hazard and the issue of risk—based pricing.The conclusions are as follows:1. In light of the pricing rule based on risk,we can provide an efficient solution for moral hazard;2. When the information is asymmetric,due to the problem of time and adverse selection,it is impossible to price the deposit insurance fairly.3. As one of the consequences resulted from the deposit insurance institution,the competition in the banking industry will be more dramatic,which will increase the cost of banking failure.

关 键 词：存款保险制度 道德风险 定价策略 

分 类 号：F840.3[经济管理—保险]