最优存款保险设计——国际经验与理论分析  

Optimal Deposit Insurance Design?:International Experiences and Theoretical Analysis

作　　者：姚志勇[1] 夏凡[2] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433 [2]北京大学光华管理学院,北京100871

出　　处：《金融研究》2012年第7期98-111,共14页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(02CJL007);教育部"留学回国人员科研启动基金"和教育部"博士点基金"的资助

摘　　要：本文结合国际经验和理论分析,探讨最优存款保险机制设计。首先,本文通过德国、巴西、俄罗斯等国典型经验,分析建立激励相容存款保险制度以及金融安全网成员协调合作的经验和教训。其次,在此基础上,本文针对信息不对称导致的问题,设计了成本最小化的激励相容存款保险合约。本文证明给定适当补贴,满足"参与约束",并同时规避"逆向选择"和"道德风险"的存款保险合约存在且不唯一,并且这些合约是针对不同类型银行自我选择的动态合约组合。最后,本文对建立中国存款保险制度提出政策建议。This paper discusses the optimal deposit insurance design combining the international experiences with the theoretical analysis. Firstly, the paper analyzes the experiences and lessons about building up the incentive-compatible deposit insurance system and the cooperation among the members of the financial safety net. Secondly, the paper designs the incentive-compatible insurance contracts with minimum cost, targeting the problems induced by asymmetric information. The paper also proves that with proper subsidies, there exist many contracts which can satisfy the participation constraints, the incentive compatibility constraints for both moral hazard and adverse selection simultaneously. Furthermore, these contracts are dynamic self-selection contracts for the different types of the banks. Lastly, based on the analysis, the authors provide policy implications for the establishment of China＇s deposit insurance system.

关 键 词：存款保险 激励相容 道德风险 逆向选择 

分 类 号：F841[经济管理—保险] F831.2F224