银行监督降低了经理人代理成本吗?来自房地产上市公司的证据  

Does Banking Supervision Reduce the Manager's Agent Cost? An Empirical Test on Panel Data of Listed Real Estate Companies

作　　者：白积洋[1] 

机构地区：[1]中共湛江市委党校经济教研室

出　　处：《科学决策》2012年第6期1-32,共32页Scientific Decision Making

摘　　要：论文以银行监督与经理人代理成本为主线,研究银行监督作为一种外部治理机制与内部治理机制、政府控制和债权人保护(法律环境)之间的关系如何影响经理人代理成本。研究表明:银行在房地产上市公司中不但没有发挥监督作用,反而提高了经理人代理成本,即银行负债的杠杆治理效应被严重扭曲,相反,非银行负债在房地产上市公司中发挥了应有的杠杆治理效应。因此,必须进一步深化银行与国有企业的产权改革,其重点是降低政府干预程度,发挥银行负债的硬约束功能;银行作为企业的大债权人应该担负"投资者"与"治理者"的双重角色,按照契约规定主动参与和监督企业的经营决策,发挥其应有的公司治理效应。This paper takes bank supervision and the manager agency costs as the main line to study how bank supervision as an external governance mechanisms affect the manager agency costs with internal governance mechanisms, government control and creditor protection （ legal environment）, The study has shown that banks in the real estate listed companies failed to play a supervisory role, but to improve the manager＇s agency costs, and leverage governance effect in bank debt has been seriously distorted. In contrast, non- bank liabilities in the real estate lis- ted companies have played a leverage governance effects Therefore, banks and state - owned enterprises need reform further in property rights; the emphasis is to lower government interven- tion so as to play hard constraints＇ functions on bank liabilities. Banks should play its proper cor- porate governance as major creditors.

关 键 词：银行监督 经理人代理成本 房地产上市公司 公司治理 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]