不完全信息、外部约束与保险监管策略  

Incomplete Information,External Restriction and Supervision Strategy

作　　者：王东[1] 

机构地区：[1]对外经贸大学保险学院

出　　处：《科学决策》2012年第6期54-64,共11页Scientific Decision Making

摘　　要：保险市场普遍存在的信息不完全现象,不仅仅体现在保险公司和投保人之间,也体现在监管机构和保险公司之间,这个问题对保险监管的有效性具有很大影响;受各种因素的影响,监管机构的行为不一定严格遵循监管原则,从而会进一步造成监管效率的损失。要解决这个问题,研究证明,加强对保险监管机构的外部约束是一个可行的策略,通过对监管机构建立完备的激励约束机制,可以提高保险监管的有效性,这对我国保险监管的改革和创新也具有较强的现实意义。The phenomenon of incomplete information is pervasive in the insurance market, which not only exists between insurance company and policy holder, but also exists between insurance company and regulator, so it has great impact on the effectiveness of insurance regulation. Influ- enced by many factors, behavior of insurance regulator doesn＇t always follow regulation rules, which can cause efficient losses. The paper proved that reinforcing the external constraint to in- surance regulator is a practical strategy. Setting up an enduring incentive and constraint mecha- nism can improve the effect of insurance supervision.

关 键 词：保险监管 不完全信息 外部约束 

分 类 号：F840.3[经济管理—保险]