基于虚拟第三方的不同决策内容下供应链激励协调研究  

Research on Supply Chain Incentives Coordination with Different Decisions Based on Virtual Third Party

作　　者：黄梅萍[1] 汪贤裕[1] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学工商管理学院,成都610064

出　　处：《软科学》2012年第7期137-139,共3页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071103)

摘　　要：针对不同决策内容引起供应链效率的差异,运用委托代理理论,引入虚拟第三方为无私的委托人来对一类二级供应链进行双向激励,并且进一步比较了虚拟第三方不同决策内容下的供应链激励协调问题。研究结果表明,将订货权限下放给销售商,不仅能够有效地促进供应商和销售商努力工作,而且更能够提升供应链的整体收益。Different decisions lead to different efficiency of supply chain.To solve this problem,principal-agent theory is applied in this paper,and virtual-third party is introduced as selfless principal,to incent supplier and seller.Meanwhile,this paper deeply analyzes the problem under the different decisions of the virtual third party.The result shows that if the seller has the order authority,both the supplier and the seller will work harder and the whole supply chain can get greater benefits.

关 键 词：二级供应链 双边道德风险 虚拟第三方 决策内容 委托代理 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]