从银行外部性角度谈银行保险的发展  

Discussion on Bancassurance Development from the Angle of Externality

作　　者：孙健[1] 刘铮[1] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学保险学院,北京100029

出　　处：《保险研究》2012年第7期75-81,共7页Insurance Studies

基　　金：教育部人文社科规划基金项目(基金号:10YJA790164);国家自然科学基金项目(71173038);对外经济贸易大学研究生科研创新基金一般项目(基金号:A2012026)

摘　　要：本文尝试从银行外部性的视角分析银保合作的选择问题,依据科斯定理,借助数理过程,说明银行保险的产生是为解决银行外部性所进行的自由"协商"的结果。金融集团化是当下银行保险发展的最有利状态,建议放松分业限制,主要由市场机制决定银行保险未来发展趋势,并配合由管理者负责初始权利分配制度的设计。With business expansion and profit rise, China＇s bancassurance receives more and more attention from banks and insurers. But the research on form choice of bank-insurance cooperation based on root causes of bancassurance is few. This paper attempted to analyze form choice of bank-insurance cooperation from the perspective of bank externality. According to the Coase Theorem and mathematical process, this paper indicated the emergence of bancassurance was the results of free＂ consultation＂ for solving the bank externality issue. This paper concluded that the financial holding structure was the most beneficial form for development of bancassurance in the current state, and recommended relaxation of separate operation regulation among the financial sector, and allowed the market mechanism to decide the future development trend of bancassurance. Accordingly, the design of initial allocation of rights system should be conducted by managing bodies.

关 键 词：银行保险 外部性 交易成本 

分 类 号：F840.32[经济管理—保险]