基于有限理性的农村联保贷款合谋防范机制设计  

The Prevention Mechanism Design of Rural Group Lending Conspiracy Based on Bounded Rationality

作　　者：吴敬[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学统计学院,天津300222 [2]天津农商银行,天津300222

出　　处：《上海金融》2012年第7期47-52,117,共6页Shanghai Finance

摘　　要：联保小组合谋是农村联保贷款失败的重要原因之一,设计出防范合谋的机制才能实现农村金融的可持续性发展。文章研究和对比了静态、动态模型下以及农户有限理性下联保贷款合谋的条件以及相应防范机制,证明了有限理性农户会增加合谋的风险,为了规避这种风险,需要政府以及掌控人等提供一些增强农户理性程度的措施,银行需要提供额度递增、自有资金比例降低和利率递减等条件的合同诱使农户采取积极还贷注重长期利益的策略。Group conspiracy is one of the major reasons why the group lending in rural areas fails.The sustainable development of rural finance is impossible without the mechanism to prevent group conspiracy.Based on the analysis of the conditions and the relevant preventions of group lending conspiracy in terms of both static and dynamic models as well as under the bounded rationality of the rural households,the thesis contends in order to prevent the risk,the government and the controllers need to take measures to improve rationality of the rural households while the banks should make contracts more favorable to them in terms of an increasing lending quota,a decreasing proportion of their own capitals and a decreasing interest rate so as to induce farmers to take a positive repayment strategy with a focus on long-term interests.

关 键 词：有限理性 农村 联保贷款 合谋 机制设计 

分 类 号：F832.43[经济管理—金融学]