非对称信息下工业废弃物交易合约机制  

Contract Design for Industrial Waste Trading with Asymmetric Information

作　　者：李海燕[1,2] 但斌[1] 饶凯[1,3] 张旭梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030 [2]重庆理工大学工商管理学院,重庆400054 [3]比萨圣安娜大学,比萨意大利56127

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2012年第4期494-500,共7页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871128);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-10-0884)

摘　　要：面对当前严峻的资源环境形势,研究工业废弃物交易合约机制以提高交易效率、实现废弃物充分再利用,具有重要的实际价值。基于委托-代理理论,建立了废弃物提供商与利用商之间的交易博弈模型,设计了基于用量激励的交易合约机制。通过对基本交易合约的分析,揭示了非对称信息下逆向选择可能导致工业废弃物交易效率低下的问题,进一步从激励实现系统最优利用量的角度,研究了逆向选择最优交易合约的特征及效率。结果表明,基于(价格,利用量)的一组分离合约菜单可以有效规避逆向选择,提高交易效率,实现废弃物充分再利用。Facing the current serious situation of environment and resource,studying on the contract mechanism of industrial waste trading in order to improve trade efficiency and achieve full reuse of waste has important practical value.Using the principal-agent theory,a trading game model between waste supplier and recycling manufacturer is developed and the trading contracting mechanism based on quantity incentive is designed.Through the analysis of general trading contract,we show that adverse selection could lead to inefficiency of industrial waste trading under asymmetric information.Furthermore,from the perspective of realizing system optimal utilization by incentive,we study the characteristics and efficiency of optimal trading contract of adverse selection.The results suggest that a group of separating contract menu based on（price,quantity） can avoid adverse selection,improve the trading efficiency and make full use of wastes.

关 键 词：资源环境 工业废弃物 非对称信息 逆向选择 合约机制 

分 类 号：F403.3[经济管理—产业经济] F205