长春市空间扩展非协调性及其行为主体博弈机理研究  

Study on the Discordance of Spatial Expansion and its Behavior Subject Game Mechanism in Changchun

作　　者：孙平军[1] 修春亮[1] 林俊钦[2] 李一曼[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北师范大学城市与环境科学学院 [2]浙江大学经济学院

出　　处：《现代城市研究》2012年第8期59-64,共6页Modern Urban Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(41071109);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(NO.10SSXT101)

摘　　要：城镇建设用地空间扩展研究是可持续发展研究中的重要组成部分。针对当前国内外城市空间扩展相对缺乏协调性及其行为主体博弈机理的研究,文中以 1993 ～ 2010 年的长春市为例,运用弹性系数,从人口、经济和固定资产投资与城市建设用地间增长速度视角分析其城市空间扩展的非协调性,从地方政府与农民的征地博弈、开发商的区位选择博弈、绩效考核体制与分税制下的中央(或上级政府)与地方政府的博弈、"产权区域"视角的区际政府博弈、"条块管理体制下"的中央部门与地方政府博弈以及城市公众的需求博弈等方面分析各行为主体对城市空间无序、非协调性扩展的原因机理所在。结果表明:三者的弹性系数都大于 1,城市空间无序、低效扩展态势非常明显;其中"用地—固定资产投资弹性系数"与"用地—经济弹性系数"几乎相差 4 倍,进一步印证了城市建设用地的低效投入,而"用地—人口弹性系数"与"用地—经济弹性系数"的比较表明地方政府更多注重经济效率,而相对忽视"人"的发展,严重抑制了人口城镇化进程;行为主体间的博弈更多反应出来的是一种制度安排不合理,制度安排是其价值扭曲的根源所在。据此最后从制度设计层面提出对策建议。Research on spatial expansion of urban construction land is an important part of sustainable development. Concerning about the current research that lacks coordination and the game mechanism of behavior subject, this article takes ChangChun as a case, using elasticity coefficient, from the perspective of the speed between population, economy, fixed assets investment and urban construction land input to analyze it＇s disco-ordination of urban spatial expansionAccording to the game of land expropriation between local government and farmers, the game of choosing location among developers, the game between central government （or upper government） and local government under the system of performance assessment, tax distribution, the game among interregional governments under the condition of ＂property right area＂, and the game between the central authorities and local government under the condition of ＂administration by piece combination＂, and the game of demand among city public, to analysis the mechanism of urban space disorder and urban sprawl disco-ordination. The result shows that the three elasticity coefficients are greater than 1, and urban spatial disorder and the low efficiency of expansion is very apparent. Among them the ＂elasticity coefficient of land--fixed assets investment＂ and the ＂elasticity coefficient of land--economy＂ are almost differ from four times, which verify the low efficiency of urban construction land investment further; however, the comparison of ＂elasticity coefficient of land-- population＂ and ＂elasticity coefficient of land--economy＂ indicates that the local government attaches more importance to economic benefits, and ignores human development, which greatly inhibits the urbanization of population. The game among behavior subjects more reflects the unreasonable arrangement institution, which is the source of value distortion. Because of this, at last, from institutional aspects, we put forward some and suggestions.

关 键 词：空间扩展 非协调性 行为主体 博弈机理 长春市 

分 类 号：TU984.113[建筑科学—城市规划与设计]