市场集中、控制权特征与内部控制鉴证报告披露  

Market Concentration,Control Rights and Disclosure of Auditor's Internal Control Report

作　　者：佟岩[1] 冯红卿[1] 吕栋[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京理工大学管理与经济学院,100081

出　　处：《会计研究》2012年第6期61-66,93,共6页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(项目批准号70902012;71172171);教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目(项目批准号09YJC790016)的阶段性成果;北京理工大学基础研究基金(项目批准号20082142007;20092140003)资助

摘　　要：企业披露自愿信息可以获取部分竞争优势。在相对集中的市场中企业间互相依存的程度更强,此时企业需要在充分披露信息以吸引投资者和酌情披露信息以避免泄露商业秘密之间进行权衡。内部控制鉴证报告包含的专有信息比较有限,且作为自愿信息可以向市场传递积极信号,故而成为企业获取竞争优势的手段之一。本文用2007-2009年深沪两市4131个样本检验发现:整体上内部控制鉴证报告披露的概率随着市场集中程度的变化呈倒U型关系;当市场从极度分散向相对集中变化时,非国有企业更倾向于披露内部控制鉴证报告获取一定优势;但如果金字塔层级较多,非国有企业的内部控制鉴证报告披露动机会减弱。Corporations try to acquire competitive advantages via voluntary information disclosure.Because corporations have closer interdependent relationship in a relatively concentrated market,they must tradeoff between adequate disclosure which could attract investors and discretionary disclosure which aims to avoid information leakage.Firms prefer to make the auditor's internal control reports public due to their good signaling effect and little special information.We get a sample composed by 4131 data from 2007 to 2009 and find three points: the disclosure of auditor's internal control reports has a significantly reversed U relationship with market concentration; when the HHI index increases,private enterprises prefer to disclose auditor's internal control report than SOEs do; but if they have more pyramid levels,the probability of disclosing auditor's internal control report gets lower.

关 键 词：市场集中 内部控制鉴证报告 控制权 

分 类 号：F233[经济管理—会计学] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济] F224