税收征管存在“粘蝇纸”效应吗  

Is There“Flypaper Effect”in Local Tax Collection of China

作　　者：李建军[1] 肖育才[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学财政税务学院 [2]西南民族大学经济学院

出　　处：《南开经济研究》2012年第2期55-66,共12页Nankai Economic Studies

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目“中国税收征管效率实证研究”(10CJY066)的支持

摘　　要：根据"粘蝇纸"理论,地方政府在支出上偏好转移支付胜于自有收入,在地方不具税收立法权及支出需要既定下,中央转移支付的增加,降低税收征管努力及征管效率便是地方的理性选择。本文在对地方税收征管效率进行测算的基础上,进一步研究发现转移支付对地方税收征管效率有显著的负效应,地方税收征管行为呈现出"粘蝇纸"效应。因此,应优化转移支付制度,使转移支付与地方税收征管激励相容。According to the theory of flypaper effect, local government prefer to get grants from higher level government rather than tax local resident＇s income; under the condition of not having tax legislative power and expenditure needs being given, with the increase in transfer revenue from central government, reducing tax collection efforts and efficiency is the rational choice of local government. The empirical analyses show transfer payment has a significant negative effect on tax collection efficiency of local taxation bureau, local tax collection behaviors show a ＂flypaper effect＂, therefore, China should optimize the trans- fer payment system, and let transfers and local tax collection be incentive compatibility.

关 键 词：税收征管效率 转移支付 地方税务局 粘蝇纸效应 

分 类 号：F812.42[经济管理—财政学]