基于信息不对称的突发需求风险管理  

Managing Demand Disruption under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：张鹏飞[1] 王谦[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学院研究生院管理学院,北京100190

出　　处：《管理评论》2012年第7期143-151,共9页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70601031);国家自然科学基金重点项目(70731003)

摘　　要：供应链中信息不对称和需求突变现象普遍存在。信息缺乏方希望既获得真实的信息又尽可能地减小需求突变对自己的影响。本文研究由于某种原因市场需求发生突变,变化量有高低两种可能且是零售商的私有信息的情形,针对由一个生产商和一个零售商组成的供应链,我们设计了由批发价、订货量和经济补贴三个参数构成的两套批发合同供零售商选择。研究表明在大多数情况下该合同可以满足生产商"既辨别出真实的需求变化又最大化利润"的目的。Information asymmetry and demand disruption are common in supply chains. The information disadvantage side hopes to get real information while minimizing the negative impact of the demand disruption. We model a supply chain with one manufacture and one retailer. Because of some unexpected events, the market demand experiences a sudden change which is either high or low and is the retailer＇ s private information. We design two contracts composed of three parameters： the wholesale price, order size and compensation. The retailer can choose any one of them independently according to the principle of profit maximization. We find that the contracts will most of the time meet manufacturers＇ demand to get the real information while maximizing profit.

关 键 词：信息不对称 突发需求风险:合同设计 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F274