国有商业银行制度变迁的理性选择模型——兼论国有商业银行经理人行为的作用  

Reasonable Choice Model of System Change of State-owned Commercial Bank——On Role of Manager Behaviour of State-owned Commercial Bank

作　　者：陈晖[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南大学经济学院,河南开封475000

出　　处：《济源职业技术学院学报》2012年第2期63-67,共5页Journal of Jiyuan Vocational and Technical College

摘　　要：在国有商业银行制度变迁过程中,作为国有商业股东的政府和作为国有商业代理人的经理人阶层,发挥着最大程度的作用。政府和经理人的偏好、利益结构和力量对比,共同决定了国有商业银行领域的社会偏好,在给定的社会技术条件下,又决定了国有金融的生产可能性边界。这样以来,在理论上二者的利益最大化理性选择就决定了最优的国有金融制度安排。在国有商业制度选择中,经理人阶层将发挥越来越大的作用。During the changing of State - owned bank system, governments as shareholders as well as managers as agents are playing most important roles. On the one hand, the relative preference, interesting structure and strengthens of governments together with managers determine the social preference; On the other hand, they also determine production possibility frontier of State - owned bank system given social technology. As a result, their rational choices determine optimal system arrangement of state - owned bank： During this process, executive group will play increasingly great role.

关 键 词：国有商业银行制度 国有金融可能性边界 社会偏好 经理人阶层 

分 类 号：F832.33[经济管理—金融学]