公共品供给“囚徒困境”的破解与启示  

Interpretations and Implications of the "Prisoner Dilemma" in Public Goods Provision

作　　者：张天舒[1] 刘亚萍[1] 

机构地区：[1]内蒙古财经大学公共管理学院,内蒙古呼和浩特010051

出　　处：《内蒙古师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2012年第3期108-111,共4页Journal of Inner Mongolia Normal University：Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition

摘　　要：笔者从实验经济学和重复动态博弈论双重角度对公共品私人供给"囚徒困境"进行了批判。在此基础上,阐明了改进模型的方式,提出了矫正公共品私人供给博弈模型的五种途径:延长博弈链条;设计选择性激励机制;设计合理的回收机制;公共品与私人品捆绑供给;提倡优良的社会道德意识形态。以期对公共品私人供给效率的提高有所裨益。From the perspective of both experimental economics and repetitive dynamic game theory, the article criticizes the ＂ prisoner dilemma＂ of private provision of public goods. On its basis, it elaborates the method to improve the model and points out the five means to correct it. They are to prolong game chain, design alternative stimulation and rational recycle mechanisms, provide public goods bundled with private ones and advocate excellent social moral ideology with the expectation of improving the efficiency of private provision of public goods.

关 键 词：公共品 博弈 供给 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]