管理层干预、审计委员会独立性与盈余管理  

Involvment of Executive Officers, Audit Committee Independence and Earning Management

作　　者：王守海[1] 李云[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学会计学院

出　　处：《审计研究》2012年第4期68-75,共8页Auditing Research

基　　金：国家社科基金项目(项目批准号:12CGL029)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：已有研究发现,审计委员会独立性通常能够有效监控财务报告流程,而那些在形式上独立的审计委员会可能在实质上并不独立,公司管理层对董事会的干预可能对审计委员会监控作用产生重要影响。本文通过盈余管理来检验管理层干预是否会削弱审计委员会的监控效力。研究发现,当公司管理层没有涉入董事任命时,审计委员会独立性能够发挥较好的监控作用,但是,一旦公司管理层涉入董事任命,审计委员会独立性的监控作用将被削弱。Previous research finds independent audit committees are generally effective in monitoring the financial reporting processes. However, not all audit committees that appear in form to be independent are in fact actually independent. Executive officers involvement in the board selection process can affect monitoring the financial reporting of audit committees. This paper uses earning management to examine whether the benefits of independent audit committee are diminished, when executive officers are involved in the board selection members. Our results find that the monitoring benefits of an independent audit committee are only maintained when the executive officers are not involved in selection board members, but the benefits will be diminished, or even eliminated, when executive officers are involved in selection board members.

关 键 词：审计委员会 盈余管理 独立性 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学] F275[经济管理—国民经济] F832.51F224