制度环境与管理层持股的激励效应  

Institutional Environment and the Incentive Effects of Managerial Ownership

作　　者：沈红波[1] 潘飞[2] 高新梓[3] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学金融研究院,上海200433 [2]上海财经大学会计与财务研究院,上海200433 [3]上海财经大学会计学院,上海200433

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2012年第8期96-108,共13页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"政府干预与银行贷款监督的有效性研究"(批准号71102016);国家自然科学基金重点项目"以价值为基础;以战略为导向的中国企业管理会计研究"(批准号71032005);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目"中国企业管理会计行为研究"(批准号10JJD630005)

摘　　要：管理层持股激励是当前理论和实务界关注的一种重要的公司治理机制。以往的研究往往研究激励契约本身或激励契约的经济后果。然而,激励契约有效发挥的重要前提是该契约与外部制度环境相适应。本文运用制度经济学的基本原理,实证检验了股权分置改革、国有控股、产品市场竞争这三种外部制度环境对管理层持股激励效率的影响。实证研究发现:①股权分置改革前,实施管理层持股激励的公司其经营绩效相比控制样本没有显著差异;股权分置改革后,其经营绩效显著高于控制样本。②国有控股企业采用管理层持股在股改前激励效应不显著,但是,在股改后激励效应显著提高。③在竞争性的产品市场,管理层持股激励有明显的正效应;而在垄断性市场中,管理层持股的激励效应较弱。本文的研究结果表明,制度环境是管理层持股激励发挥作用的重要前提,在实施管理层持股激励的同时,还应重视相关制度环境的改善,使管理层持股发挥应有的激励效应。Managerial ownership incentive is an important corporate governance mechanism concerned by theory and practice fields. Previous studies tend to study the economic consequences of the incentive contract or the incentive contract itself. However, the incentives play effectively only adapted to the external institutional environment. This paper examines the efficiency of managerial ownership incentive in three institutional environments： non-tradable share reform, state-holding and product market competition using the basic principles of institutional economics from the perspective of effective contract. Empirical study finds that： First, the small differences in financial performance between companies with managerial ownership and those without in controls samples turned significant after the non-tradable share reform; Second, the incentive effect of managerial ownership in state-owned enterprises was significantly improved after the reform; Third, managerial ownership incentive works better in competitive market than in monopolistic market. The research results show that the institutional environment is an important premise for the efficiency of managerial ownership incentive. Thus the improvement of institutional environment should be concerned while implementing managerial ownership to make the best use of its incentive effect.

关 键 词：股权分置改革 管理层持股 激励效应 

分 类 号：F243.5[经济管理—劳动经济]