公开增发业绩门槛与盈余管理  

SEO Performance Threshold and Earnings Management

作　　者：王克敏[1] 刘博[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院

出　　处：《管理世界》2012年第8期30-42,187-188,共13页Journal of Management World

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70872023);2008年度上海市社科规划项目资助;2008年教育部新世纪人才计划资助

摘　　要：Stein(1989)和Shivakumar(2000)研究了公司应对投资者打折的盈余管理策略;Fan(2007)研究了公司区别于低质量冒充公司的盈余管理策略。基于此,本文认为,公司间业绩差异会影响公司应对低质量公司冒充及投资者打折的盈余管理策略。针对中国上市公司公开增发业绩门槛变化,本文研究发现,公司公开增发前确实通过可操控应计向上盈余管理,且随着业绩门槛提高公司间业绩差异缩小,公司应对低质量公司冒充的盈余管理激励减弱,进而应对投资者打折的盈余管理水平下降,反之亦然。本文研究表明,高业绩门槛因传递公开增发公司间业绩差异缩小的信息而具有抑制公司盈余管理作用,即高业绩门槛可以筛选高质量公开增发公司。本文研究拓展了Stein(1989)、Shivakumar(2000)和Fan(2007)有关盈余管理的理论,强调公司之间博弈会影响公司与投资者之间博弈的盈余管理效应,同时,为证监会有关发行业绩门槛政策作用提供了理论依据和实证证据。Stein(1989) and Shivakumar(2000) document that earnings management may reflect the firms' rational response to anticipated discount.Fan(2007) finds that issuers manipulate earnings to differentiate themselves from each other.Thus,we argue that,performance difference among issuers influence the issuers' earnings management,which to deal with mimickers and market discount.We show that,SEO issuers engage in accrual management,and the higher the SEO performance threshold the lower the discount and earnings management.Our finding indicates that as higher performance threshold signals lower difference among issuers,it decreases issuers' earnings manipulation,that higher performance threshold can improve issuers' quality.We extends the earnings management framework of Stein(1989),Shivakumar(2000) and Fan(2007),and emphasizes that earnings management emerging as the result of an investor-issuer game is affected by the performance difference among issures.Our finding supports the performance threshold regulation issued by China Securities Regulatory Committee(CSRC) theoretically and empirically.

关 键 词：公开增发 业绩门槛 逆向选择 盈余管理 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F275F224