以赛亚·伯林自由观的悖论：在多元与一元之间  

Value Pluralism or Value Monism?: Paradox in Isaiah Berlin's Liberalism

作　　者：程同顺[1] 张国军[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学

出　　处：《南京师大学报（社会科学版）》2012年第4期5-13,共9页Journal of Nanjing Normal University(Social Science Edition)

摘　　要：以赛亚·伯林依据价值多元论而主张消极自由,在其文本中实际上存在着两个等级序列——第一等级序列和第二等级序列——的消极自由。这种对消极自由的区分,可以解释柏林自由观的悖论,即对立基于价值多元论的消极自由的推演最终导向了消极自由价值的一元主义。这一悖论反映出伯林自由观的价值多元论与消极自由主张之间的张力。自由一元主义的结局表明伯林没有摆脱自由主义的普世主义心态,而试图将自由作为一种普世化规则的结果,必然是另一种形式的"强迫自由"。Isaiah Berlin advocated negative liberty based on his value pluralism, but his negative liberty is a complex and ambiguous concept, which can actually be classified into two types： the first order negative liberty and the second order negative liberty. This classification can throw light on this paradox embedded in Berlin＇s concept of liberty ： negative liberty based on the value pluralism leads to the monism of the value of negative liberty. The paradox reflects the tension between value pluralism and negative liberty. The monistic conclusion of negative liberty indicates that Berlin failed to be free of the mindset of universalism and instead tried to turn liberty into a universal principle, which is certain to arrive at another kind of ＂forced liberty＂.

关 键 词：以赛亚·伯林 消极自由 价值多元论 一元主义 

分 类 号：D091.5[政治法律—政治学]