环境行政执法效率的经济分析  

An economic analysis of administrative enforcement efficiency of environmental law

作　　者：张福德[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东理工大学法学院,山东淄博255049

出　　处：《中南大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第4期87-92,共6页Journal of Central South University：Social Sciences

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目<环境刑法实施效率研究>(11YJA820107);山东理工大学人文社会科学发展基金项目<环保与经济法制建设>(2010GGTD03)

摘　　要：以经济分析为方法,通过构建行为模型并以行为模型为基础,对我国环境行政执法政策选择进行分析研究,以清楚认识我国环境行政执法效率不高的症结所在,并提出提高执法效率的基本途径和方法。基于理性经济人假设,环境违法行为会对影响预期违法成本与违法收益的因素做出反应,在环境行政执法中这一因素主要是行政罚款。个人行为模型和行政行为模型显示,我国环境行政执法效率不高的症结在于行政罚款中忽视制裁率问题,并导致行政执法不能产生较好的预防环境危害行为的效果,也导致社会福利的减损,使行政执法的社会效用不能最大化。最优的环境行政罚款政策应考虑罚款数额、制裁率和环境危害之间的相互依存关系。行政责任归责标准、风险偏好和边际效用也会对最优环境行政罚款政策选择产生影响。Based on the behavior model,the author analyses and researches the enforcement policy options of environmental law in a way of economic analysis.The author ascertains the crux of the problem about inefficiency of administrative enforcement of environmental law,and advances the approach to promoting enforcement efficiency.Based on the assumption of rational economic man,environmental illegal conduct would respond to factors affected by expected illegal cost and income.Such factors are administrative fine in administrative enforcement of environmental law.Individual behavior and administrative behavior model show that the crux of the problem of inefficient administrative enforcement is that the probability of sanctions is ignored,resulting in bad effect of administrative enforcement on the precaution of environmental harmful conducts and impairment of social welfare.Because of this,the social utility of the administrative enforcement is not maximized.The optimal fine policy should take into account the interdependent relationship among environmental administrative fine,probability of sanction and environmental harm.Administrative Liability standards,risk preferences and marginal utility will exert an impact on the optimal policy choices of administrative enforcement of environmental law.

关 键 词：环境行政执法 效率 社会福利 经济分析 

分 类 号：D922.68[政治法律—环境与资源保护法学]