政府监管部门与采砂企业利益关系的博弈分析  

Analysis on interest game between government supervision department and sand mining enterprise

作　　者：杨高升[1] 梁钰翎[1] 徐新[1] 章晓锦[1] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院工程管理研究所,江苏南京211100

出　　处：《人民长江》2012年第15期98-102,共5页Yangtze River

基　　金：水利部公益性行业科研专项经费基金资助项目(201001007)

摘　　要：首先对目前河道采砂管理中所采取的经营权许可模式的优、缺点进行了比较分析,然后建立政府监管部门和采砂企业两者间的博弈模型,力图寻求监管部门与采砂企业在利益和非法采砂活动之间的互动规律。通过对博弈模型的分析,找到了博弈双方的混合策略纳什均衡点,得出了政府的监管成本、处罚力度以及采砂企业的预期收益等因素会对监管部门和采砂企业的博弈行为产生影响。最后结合模型以及国家有关政策规定,对长江中下游某市的采砂管理情况进行了分析。可为相关管理执法部门提供参考。We analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the operating right of sand mining licensing mode used in river sand mining management, and then set up a game model between government supervision department and sand excavation enterprise to seek a relationship and interaction of interests and illegal sand mining. Through the analysis of the game model, we find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium point of both sides, the factors such as the supervision costs and punishment intensity of govern- ment, expected return of sand mining enterprise may exert impact on the game behavior of the two sides. We make a case study on sand mining management in a city on the middle and lower Yangtze River according to the model and some regulation policies.

关 键 词：博弈分析 成本 政府监管 处罚力度 采砂管理 

分 类 号：TV85[水利工程—水利水电工程]