基于混合策略博弈的我国优秀运动员流动影响因素分析  

Factors Influencing Elite Chinese Athletes Based on Mixed Strategic Game Model

作　　者：陈静[1,2] 姚家新[3] 戴群[4] 吉承恕[5] 张运亮[5] 刘晓黎[6] 鲍春雨[7] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理学院,天津300072 [2]天津体育学院体育文化传媒系,天津300381 [3]天津体育学院院长办公室,天津300381 [4]天津体育学院运动心理学实验中心,天津300381 [5]天津体育学院体育文化艺术系,天津300381 [6]天津体育学院教务处,天津300381 [7]天津体育学院体育教育与训练一系,天津300381

出　　处：《武汉体育学院学报》2012年第7期67-70,共4页Journal of Wuhan Sports University

基　　金：国家哲学社会科学项目(08BTY026)

摘　　要：建立以优秀运动员、运动员现所属组织和流动目的组织为博弈主体的混合策略博弈模型,并对其策略选择进行分析。依据纳什均衡解得出注册优先权是影响运动员流动的核心要素,运动员现所属组织使用注册优先权与否,很大程度上决定了运动员流动或者流动的流畅性;转会费、制度成本和契约成本也是影响运动员流动的因素;运动员流动的概率与注册优先权成负相关的关系;组织间利益的负关联妨碍了我国优秀运动员流动各利益方合作共赢的意愿和行为。提出逐步限制注册优先权、完善转会费制度、增加训练补偿金等建议。Strategic choices of the Mixed Strategic Game Model built with organizations to which the elite Chinese athletes belonging as the main subjects were analyzed. According to Nash equilibrium, registered priority was the core influential factor in the flow of the athletes. Whether affiliated organizations applied to registered priority or not decided on the flow of the athletes. Transfer fee, system cost and contract cost also contributed to the athlete flow. There was negative correlation between athlete flow and registered priority. Negative correlation between organizations limited cooperation between the interest parties. To solve related problems, registered priority should be re- stricted, transfer fee svstem should be further perfected and training compensation should be increased.

关 键 词：运动员流动 三方博弈 混合策略 

分 类 号：G804.8[文化科学—运动人体科学]