企业安全激励机制的博弈分析  被引量:6

Incentive safety-reward analysis for enterprises based on the game theory

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作  者:纪承子[1] 谢贤平[1] 李锦峰[1] 

机构地区:[1]昆明理工大学国土资源工程学院,昆明650093

出  处:《安全与环境学报》2012年第4期221-224,共4页Journal of Safety and Environment

摘  要:从管理的角度提出安全激励的方法,介绍了激励的定义及其在安全管理中的作用。以委托代理原理为基础对激励方和被激励方之间关系进行了博弈分析,分别建立了有监督机制的静态博弈模型和竞争机制的动态博弈模型。通过对两种模型求解纳什均衡和分析均衡状态,论证了监督博弈模型和竞争博弈模型的可行性,认为监督和竞争机制更能有效地提高激励效率,得出影响激励效率的相关因素。有针对性提出具体要求和措施,认为应该制定符合员工需求的并在满足企业利益前提下最大化的奖励条件,降低监察成本,开展竞争制度,排除影响激励进行的外在干扰因素和制定合理的完善的激励制度,以提高员工安全生产的积极性。This paper intends to introduces a safety incentive reward method developed by its authors from the perspective of safety management and control based on the game theory. For our research goal, we have first of all to introduce briefly the definition of incen- tive, and, then, the concept and the applicability of the game theory. In order to prevent hazardous accidents and achieve production safety in the enterprises, needless to say, advanced technology and management methods are to be introduced to and tightly implemented for the research, however, this doesn' t seem enough. As a matter of fact, human factors should be put into the forefront and prominent po- sitions. Then, what is the purpose to use the game theory and how to apply it to the safety incentive mechanism will be the central topic of this paper. It is the theory that can contribute to the successful management and safety warranty for enterprise production. Safety incentive is actually considered to be closely related to the entrusted pro- duction management and the reward-and award incentive interactive safety control system. Enterprise is by nature a consignor, with employees being agents. It is the enterprise who entrusts employees for safety production. Based on the theory of entrust and agent, two game models are initiated between the incentive relationship of enterprise and the staff: the first is the static game model of safety incentive with supervision mechanism; and the second is the dynamic game model, joining the safety incentive with the reward mechanism for the competitive winners. Two models are then compared and analyzed to prove the feasibility of models with supervision and competition mechanism. The supervision and competition as the management means can help to improve the incentive efficiency remarkably, thus turning to be the influential factors for safety production and resulting in Nash equilibrium and formulating the equilibrium status quo. To this end, we have also put forward some practical demands and measures in how

关 键 词:安全管理工程 博弈论 激励 委托-代理 

分 类 号:K921[历史地理—人文地理学] O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]

 

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