逆向供应链中退货快速处理的委托代理问题  

Principal-agent problem for returns fast processing in reverse supply chain

作　　者：李明芳[1] 蒋佳[1] 薛景梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]河北科技大学经济管理学院,河北石家庄050018

出　　处：《计算机集成制造系统》2012年第8期1894-1901,共8页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems

基　　金：国家科技支撑计划资助项目(2012BAH20B00);河北省社科基金资助项目(HB12YJ063);河北科技大学博士基金资助项目(QD201048);河北省科学技术研究与发展计划资助项目(114572153)~~

摘　　要：为推进逆向供应链系统中新产品退货的快速处理工作,分析了制造商—代销商之间的委托代理问题。对称信息条件下,代销商快速处理退货的努力行为达到了系统最优水平,整个供应链系统处于协调状态。不对称信息条件下,代销商的努力水平低于系统最优水平,供应链系统处于不协调状态;代销商的努力水平与其收益分享系数正相关,进而与代销商的风险偏好度和退货市场的不确定性负相关,与代销商的能力水平正相关。线性合同中引入第二个可观测变量,能够有效提高代销商的收益分享系数和努力水平,降低供应链系统的不协调性,但整个系统仍然处于不协调状态;供应链系统各项代理成本均降低,有效缓解了制造商—代销商之间的委托代理问题。To promote the rapid procession of new product returns in reverse supply chain, the principal-agent prob- lem between manufacturer and dealer was analyzed. With symmetric information, dealers＇ effort level reached opti- mal level of system, and the whole supply chain was coordinated; with asymmetric information, dealers＇ effort level was lower than optimal level of system, and the whole supply chain was uncoordinated. Meanwhile, dealer＇s effort level was positively correlated with its revenue sharing factor, which was negatively correlated with dealer＇s risk preference and the uncertainty of product returns, and positively correlated with dealer＇s processing ability of re- turns. With a second observable variables introduced into the linear contract, both the dealer＇s revenue sharing fac- tor and its effort level were improved, and the supply chain system＇s incompatibility was reduced. However, the whole supply chain system was still uncoordinated. With two factor linear contract, all agency cost of the supply chain was reduced, so the principal-agent problem between manufacturer and dealer was alleviated effectively.

关 键 词：退货管理 逆向供应链 不对称信息 委托代理 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济] O227[理学—运筹学与控制论]