我国风电产业制度变迁路径依赖的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of China's Wind Power Industrial System Change Path Dependence

作　　者：周艳[1] 王子龙[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,南京211106

出　　处：《科学学与科学技术管理》2012年第9期55-65,共11页Science of Science and Management of S.& T.

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71003048);南京航空航天大学青年科技创新基金项目(NR2011003)

摘　　要：以一个最优化的理论模型分析路径依赖对我国风电产业制度变迁的演化方向及综合影响。利用演化博弈的理论方法,以政府、政治利益集团、行业协会、企业以及消费者五个行为主体间的利益为出发点,建立风电产业内外部制度变迁的演化博弈模型,对所建立的复制动态方程进行局部稳定性分析,深入研究了博弈主体行为选择的演化路径,在此基础上提出克服风电产业制度变迁路径依赖的政策措施。This paper analysed the effect of path dependence on China＇s wind power industrial system change＇s evolutionary direction and combined influence by an optimum theoretical model. A wind power industry of inter- nal and external system change evolutionary game model was build up, using the method of evolutionary game theory, based on the interests of the government, political interests,industry association, the enterprise and the con- sumer, and analyzed its local stability of copy dynamic equation that was established above, then the evolutionary path of game players＇ behavior choices were studied deeply, based on this, policy measures of path dependence on China＇s wind power industry Institutional change were put forward.

关 键 词：风电产业 制度变迁 路径依赖 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F269.22[经济管理—国民经济]