基于利益集团理论的基础设施市场化改革风险研究  

Study on the Risk of Infrastructure Market-oriented Reform Based on the Theory of Interest Groups

作　　者：张树全[1] 

机构地区：[1]贵州大学公共管理系,贵州贵阳5500025

出　　处：《湖南财政经济学院学报》2012年第4期30-34,共5页Journal of Hunan University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：贵州省哲学社会科学规划课题青年项目"新形势下贵州转变经济发展方式的评价指标体系与实现路径研究"(项目编号:GJ2012065)阶段研究成果之一

摘　　要：基础设施市场化改革涉及政府部门、企业和消费者等利益集团的利益博弈。通过博弈分析,政府部门和企业存在共谋动机,以实现其利益最大化,但会降低社会福利,增加改革风险。应当通过实行信息公开机制和公共参与制度,对政府部门的自由裁量权进行限制和监督,有效化解基础设施市场化改革风险。The infrastructure market-oriented reform involves the interest groups game of interest government departments,businesses and consumers.Through game analysis,it exists conspiracy motive between government departments and businesses to achieve interest maximization,but it would reduce social welfare and increase the reform risks.Information disclosure mechanism and public participation system should be introduced to limit and supervise the discretion of the government departments,effectively defusing the risk of infrastructure market-oriented reforms.

关 键 词：基础设施 市场化 利益集团 改革 

分 类 号：F294[经济管理—国民经济] F062.6