Unlicensed Spectrum Sharing Game Between LEO Satellites and Terrestrial Cognitive Radio Networks  

作　　者：XIE Zhuochen MA LU LIANG Xuwen 

机构地区：[1]Shanghai Engineering Center for Micro-satellites,Shanghai 200050,China [2]Shanghai Institute of Microsystem and Information Technology,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Shanghai 200050,China [3]Graduate University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100049,China

出　　处：《Chinese Journal of Aeronautics》2012年第4期605-614,共10页中国航空学报（英文版）

基　　金：Ministry Level Project

摘　　要：By cognitive radio,the low Earth orbit（LEO） satellites may prefer to operate in the unlicensed spectrum which is open to all the users,and compete for the limited resources with terrestrial cognitive radio networks（CRNs）.The competition can be regarded as a game and analyzed with game theory.This particular unlicensed spectrum sharing problem is modeled here,and the special properties of ＂spatially-distinguished-interference＂ and the short period of the interactions between satellites and terrestrial CRNs are explored.Then,the problem is formulated as a ＂partially-blind＂ finitely repeated prisoner＇s dilemma by game theory.Finally,we begin with two promising spectrum sharing schemes,which can be used to enforce the frequency reuse among the remotely located terrestrial CRN players as well as to overcome the observation noise.By analysis and comparison,it is proposed that the novel refreshing-contrite-tit-for-tat（R-CTFT） is the optimal spectrum sharing scheme.Simulation results verify that it can be used to utilize the spectrum most efficiently.By cognitive radio,the low Earth orbit（LEO） satellites may prefer to operate in the unlicensed spectrum which is open to all the users,and compete for the limited resources with terrestrial cognitive radio networks（CRNs）.The competition can be regarded as a game and analyzed with game theory.This particular unlicensed spectrum sharing problem is modeled here,and the special properties of ＂spatially-distinguished-interference＂ and the short period of the interactions between satellites and terrestrial CRNs are explored.Then,the problem is formulated as a ＂partially-blind＂ finitely repeated prisoner＇s dilemma by game theory.Finally,we begin with two promising spectrum sharing schemes,which can be used to enforce the frequency reuse among the remotely located terrestrial CRN players as well as to overcome the observation noise.By analysis and comparison,it is proposed that the novel refreshing-contrite-tit-for-tat（R-CTFT） is the optimal spectrum sharing scheme.Simulation results verify that it can be used to utilize the spectrum most efficiently.

关 键 词：satellite communication systems cognitive radio unlicensed spectrum sharing spatially-distinguished-interference finitely repeated prisoner＇s dilemma partially-blind refreshing-contrite-tit-for-tat 

分 类 号：TN927.2[电子电信—通信与信息系统] TN929.5[电子电信—信息与通信工程]