官员规模、公共品供给与社会收入差距：权力寻租的视角  

Officials Scale,Public Goods Supply and Social Income Gap:A Perspective of Rent Seeking

作　　者：桂林[1,2] 陈宇峰[3,4] 尹振东[5,2] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学经济学院 [2]中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心 [3]浙江工商大学经济学院 [4]浙江工商大学现代商贸研究中心 [5]山东大学经济学院

出　　处：《经济研究》2012年第9期140-151,共12页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：浙江省哲学社会科学基金之江青年项目(11ZJQN059YB);浙江省哲学社会科学重点研究基地(浙商研究中心)重大招标项目等资助

摘　　要：官员规模、公共品供给效率以及社会收入差距是当下社会比较关注的问题,本文试图把三个问题纳入到一个故事框架下来分析和解释。生产的进行需要官员提供资源帮扶,这需要通过雇佣下级官员来做到;当私人利益进入上级官员的收益函数时,上级官员就会促使资源的供给"人为"稀缺来设租,从而便于下级官员从生产者处收取资源租金;而资源租金的收取使得下级官员的收益高于其外部选择权收益,从而增加了下级官员职位的竞争性,又由于上级官员对下级官员职位任命权的垄断,使上级官员从下级官员处收取职位租金。分析表明,权力的设租寻租行为是造成社会收入差距出现的一个重要原因;在一个能较好限制官员关注私人收益的社会中,官员规模较小、公共品供给效率较高且因权力寻租而造成的社会收入差距较小。Officials scale, public goods supply efficiency and social income gap is the current social issues of concern, this paper tries to put the three questions into a unified framework to analyze. Social production need the official provide a resource aid and public goods by hiring junior officials. When the superior officer cares about private interests, he will make the resources supply be ＂ artificial＂ scarce, which makes the charge of resource rents from producers by junior officials conveniently. It facilitates the superior officer to charge junior officials＇ position rents that resource rents is higher than the external option income. Analysis shows that behavior of rent-setting and rent-seeking is one of the main causes of the emergence of the social income gap. A society with better limited public power will have smaller officials scale, more efficient supply of public goods and smaller social income gap.

关 键 词：设租 寻租 官员规模 公共品供给 社会收入差距 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学] F124.4[政治法律—中外政治制度] F224[经济管理—世界经济]