基于博弈论视角的城镇居民医疗保险制度道德风险防范分析  

Analyzing the moral hazard prevention in medical insurance system for urban residents based on game theory

作　　者：于微微[1] 徐斌[1] 胡西厚[1] 李继宏[1] 

机构地区：[1]滨州医学院,山东烟台264003

出　　处：《中国卫生事业管理》2012年第9期669-671,共3页Chinese Health Service Management

基　　金：山东省自然科学基金项目(项目编号:ZR2010GM009)

摘　　要：我国城镇居民医疗保险一直受到道德风险的困扰,道德风险对城镇居民医疗保险制度产生了潜在的巨大危害,因此抑制城镇居民医疗保险领域道德风险是确保其健康发展的重要问题。文章从分析城镇居民医疗保险道德风险主要影响因素入手,结合医疗机构与城镇居民医疗保险经办机构之间的博弈分析,提出城镇居民医疗保险道德风险的防范措施。The medical insurance system for urban residents in China has been influenced by moral hazard, which had resuited in potential damage on the development of medical insurance system. So, it is very important to restrain moral hazard for its steady development. Started from analysis of the main influencing factors, and combined with analysis of moral hazard gaming, to prevent moral hazard in medical insurance system for urban residents were put forward. Author＇s address Binzhou Medical University,Yantai,P. R. China.

关 键 词：城镇居民医疗保险制度 道德风险 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F842.6[经济管理—保险] F224.32