基于博弈论的异质型航运模型  

Game Analysis of Heterogeneous Cooperation in Transportation Service Supply Chain

作　　者：刘聪[1] 江志斌[2] 耿娜[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学中美物流研究院,上海200240 [2]上海交通大学机械与动力工程学院,上海200240

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2012年第5期609-616,共8页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金-香港研究资助局联合资助项目(70831160527);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872077)

摘　　要：根据航运业中船公司与货代合作中绝对占优的现状,设计了船公司与货代的异质合作模型,分析了船公司与货代之间的定价机制,得出船公司与货代在斯坦伯格均衡下,只有将批发运价提高到某个程度之上,船公司才会对货代进行补偿支付;在斯坦伯格均衡下,船公司的投入与自身的边际利润正相关,而货代的投入与自身的边际利润负相关,体现了此合作中货代的机会主义倾向;在合作博弈的均衡下,航运服务供应链的整体收益较非合作均衡下的收益得到了提高,并得出了船公司对货代支付比例的取值区间。进一步将结论推广为多主体合作的区域垄断航运模型,根据主体之间的占优状态重新改进了模型,将某航运区域的市场销售量提升为动态变化,得出在动态纳什均衡下,船公司与货代都有主动追加投入的动力,并且可以持续合作下去。最后,进行了数值算例的对比分析,得出在主体收益达到帕累托最优时,从投入产出比的角度考虑,未必是决策者之间的最优状态。关键词:博弈论;异质型合作;斯坦伯格均衡;This paper studies the heterogeneous cooperation in a shipping company-freight forwarder service supply chain using game analysis. Recent shipping market reviews show the dominance of the shipping company over the freight forwarder, so we intend to explore the role of vertical cooperation with respect to transaction between a shipping company and a freight forwarder through advertising expenditures and brand investments. We analyze the pricing mechanism of shipping market and prove that the shipping company will provide a portion of the freight forwarder＇ s advertising allowance if transportation price is high enough. The opportunistic behavior of the freight forwarder will prevail in Stackelberg equilibrium. The system profit is maximized for Pareto efficient in the cooperative game equilibrium. On the basis of the above study, the model has been extended to the research under dynamic environment. Both the shipping company and freight forwarder have the interior motivation to make additional investment in this case, and they will establish the stable and long-term cooperation.

关 键 词：博弈论 异质型合作 斯坦伯格均衡 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]