政府干预、大股东资产注入:支持抑或掏空  

Government Intervention and Large Shareholder's Asset Injection: Propping or Tunneling

作　　者：章卫东[1] 张洪辉[1] 邹斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学会计发展中心/会计学院,330013

出　　处：《会计研究》2012年第8期34-40,96,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：章卫东教授主持的国家自然科学基金项目"地方国有上市公司定向增发资产注入动机及经济后果研究"(项目号:71262004);江西省社科规划重点课题(10YJ04)"上市公司资产注入与公司绩效关系研究"的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：政府干预企业经营活动是普遍存在的现象。本文研究了国有控股上市公司资产注入中的"支持"、"掏空"现象。研究发现,政府控股股东比民营控股股东资产注入的动机更强烈。当上市公司盈利时,政府控股股东通过向上市公司注入资产"掏空"上市公司的动机比民营控股股东更加强烈,从而导致盈利的国有控股上市公司在资产注入之后业绩下降更多;而当政府控股上市公司被ST时,政府控股股东通过向国有控股上市公司注入资产"支持"上市公司的动机和力度比民营控股股东更加强烈,从而导致ST国有控股上市公司在资产注入之后业绩增长更快。The government intervention in corporate business activities is a widely existing phenomenon. This paper studies the phenomena of propping and tunneling in state-holding listed companies. We find that controlling shareholders in state-holding listed companies have a stronger motivation to conduct asset injection than those in private-holding listed companies. When listed companies are profitable, government controlling shareholders have a stronger motivation of ‘tunneling' listed companies they control through asset injection than private controlling shareholders, resulting in a larger decline of performance in profitable state-holding listed companies after asset injection. On the contrary, when listed companies are suffering from a special treatment (ST), government controlling shareholders have a stronger motivation of ‘propping' listed companies they control through asset injection than private controlling shareholders, and the degree of ‘propping' from government controlling shareholders is also much stronger. Thus those state-holding listed companies in ST would undergo a faster growth of performance after asset injection.

关 键 词：政府干预 资产注入 支持 掏空 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F224