资本监管、政府俘获与城市商业银行贷款行为  

Capital Supervision,Government Capture and Behavior of City Commercial Banks' Lending

作　　者：王擎[1] 潘李剑[2] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学中国金融研究中心,四川成都611130 [2]西南财经大学金融学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《南方金融》2012年第8期10-16,共7页South China Finance

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(项目编号:11JJD790043);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(项目编号:NCET-10-0697);西南财经大学研究生创新人才培养基金项目阶段性成果

摘　　要：本文使用2006-2010年我国城市商业银行的数据,从城市商业银行的贷款规模、期限结构、行业分布及风险承担四个方面实证研究了资本监管制度对我国城市商业银行贷款行为的影响。研究发现,监管当局、地方政府及城市商业银行之间存在利益博弈,由于历史原因及城市商业银行自身的特征导致城市商业银行被地方政府"俘获","俘获"加重了地方政府对城市商业银行的干预,从而导致资本监管对城市商业银行的贷款行为不能形成有效的约束,主要体现在:当城市商业银行面临监管压力时会增加对中长期贷款、房地产与电力、水利等固定资产投资行业的贷款资产的配置比例,降低拨备覆盖率和提高贷款集中度。本文还认为,由于受地方政府的干预,监管当局给予城市商业银行一年的容忍宽限期,城市商业银行在2004年并未真正进入资本监管的"硬约束"时期,而是进入了四年的监管"硬约束缓冲期"。因此,建议监管当局更加关注地方政府对城市商业银行信贷风险的影响。By using data of China＇s city commercial banks from 2006 to 2010, this paper empirically studies impacts of capital regulation on the behavior of city commercial banks＇ lending frum the perspective of the size of loans, term strueture, industry distribution and risk of the city commercial banks. The results show that there is a game of interests among the l^gulatory authorities, local government and the city commercial banks. Due to historieal reasons and its own characteristies, city commercial banks were captured by the local government. The ＂capture＂ increases local government＇s intervention in the city commercialbanks, whieh means that capital regulation on the lending practices of the loeal firms can＇t form an effective eonslraint, namely with the following phenomena： the banks increase long-term loans and fixed assets investment industry loans, sucb as real estate and power, water conservaney; reduce provision coverage and raise the c.oneentration of loans. In addition, this paper believes that the regulatory, authorities give one year of grace period to city commercial banks due to the intervention of local government. City eommercial banks did not really go in a ＂hard constraints＂ period of the capital regulation in 2004, but to enter a four-year regulatory ＂hard constraint buffer period＂. The authors propose that regulatory authorities should pay more attention to the impact of local governmenl to the eity commereial banks＇ risk in the supervision of the city commercial banks.

关 键 词：资本约束 政府俘获 城市商业银行 贷款行为 

分 类 号：F832.1[经济管理—金融学] F832.4F224