次大股东对过度投资影响研究——基于中国上市公司的经验证据  

The Impact of the Second Largest Shareholder on Slowdown Over-investment:Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：张旭辉[1,2] 叶勇 李明[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院 [2]攀枝花学院经济与管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2012年第10期1449-1456,共8页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70602035;71090402);教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(11YJA790189;12YJC790070);四川省青年科技基金资助项目(2012JQ0022);中央高校基本科研业务费专题资助项目(A0920502051113-67);教育部长江学者和创新团队发展计划资助项目(IRT0860)

摘　　要：以我国2010年上市公司为研究对象,从次大股东的视角研究了次大股东对公司过度投资的作用。通过实证研究发现:在绝对控股股权结构下,次大股东不能对控股股东的投资行为发挥有效的监督作用;当次大股东为机构投资者时,不能减缓公司的过度投资现象。将负债分为高低2组,在高负债率组中,次大股东不能减缓公司的过度投资行为;在低负债率组中,次大股东能促进公司的过度投资行为。由此,我国上市公司的次大股东不能减缓公司的过度投资,其治理作用未能发挥。Using the data of China＇s 2010 listed companies, this paper studies the role of the second lar- gest shareholding on companies＇ over-investment from the perspective of second largest shareholder, it is found that under the absolute holding ownership structure, the second largest shareholder can＇t play an effec- tive supervision role on the investment behavior of controlling shareholder; when second largest shareholder is institutional investors, they can＇t slowdown the overinvestment phenomenon; at the same time, we divided the debt into grades and found that second largest shareholder can＇t slowdown companies＇ overinvestment be- havior at high debt ratio group, while they would boost over-investment at low debt ratio group. This paper shows that second largest shareholder can＇t slowdown companies＇ over-investment, and the governance role of the second largest shareholders is not working.

关 键 词：次大股东 过度投资 股权结构 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]