连带责任、财政补贴与农村小额团体贷款  

Joint liability、fiscal subsidy and rural micro-group-lending

作　　者：周苹逢[1] 孟卫东[1] 熊维勤[2] 江丽梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030 [2]重庆工商大学经济贸易学院,重庆400067

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2012年第9期1908-1915,共8页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(08AJY028);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(09YJC790279)

摘　　要：运用机制设计理论,在信息不对称条件下设计了团体贷款防合谋契约.研究了政府补贴小额信贷机构和农户对团体贷款防合谋契约的影响.研究表明:小额信贷机构为规避逆向选择与道德风险设计团体贷款防合谋契约.基于该契约,高效率团队中的农户可获得一定信息租金,而其它借款团队中的农户仅获得保留效用:当小额信贷机构在部分村庄的期望收益小于0时,政府应补贴小额信贷机构以激励其提供团体贷款契约,补贴额至少需使其获得正的期望收益:政府为防止农户策略性违约需给予农户财政补贴,补贴额为还款额超过项目成功收益的部分.Using the mechanism design theory, this paper designs collusion-proof group lending contracts with asymmetric information, and studies the effect of the government subsidies of MFIs and rural house- holds on collusion-proof group lending contracts. The results show that collusion-proof group contracts which are designed by MFIs can avoid adverse selection and moral hazard, and farmers of high-efficiency teams could obtain some information rents but this contract would extract all rents to maintain farmers of other teams at their zero status quo utility level. If the villages＇ composition and project revenue make MFIs＇ maximum expected payoff below zero, government should provide fiscal subsidy to MFls for stim- ulating them to provide group contracts to those villages, and the subsidy must make MFIs＇ maximum expected payoff to be no less than zero. Also government should provide fiscal subsidy to rural house- holds for avoiding them to choose strategic default, while the subsidy should equal to the value that rural households＇ repayment minus their profit.

关 键 词：信息不对称 小额信贷 团体贷款 合谋 财政补贴 

分 类 号：F832.43[经济管理—金融学]