不确定AHP和Shapley值应用于投标联合体利益分配  

Profit allocation method of construction bidding alliance based on uncertainty AHP and Shapley value

作　　者：易欣[1,2] 张飞涟[1] 邱慧[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学土木工程学院,长沙410075 [2]华东交通大学土木建筑学院,南昌330013

出　　处：《计算机工程与应用》2012年第27期194-199,210,共7页Computer Engineering and Applications

基　　金：铁路环境振动与噪声教育部工程研究中心资助(No.10TM09)

摘　　要：从合作博弈论视角分析了施工企业投标联合体利益合理分配的问题,运用Shapley值法给出了投标联合体的初次分配,从参与成员的贡献度出发,建立了相应的评价指标体系模型,基于不确定型AHP在此基础上进行了适当的改进,以具体的数据为算例,结果表明改进的分配方法与成员在联合体中的价值相匹配,有利于联合体的稳定。In view of the cooperative game theory, this paper analyzes the profit-allocation problem of the construction enterprise bidding alliance. The primary allocation of bidding alliance is made with Shapley value method. The evaluation index system model has been set up through the participator＇ s contribution grade of bidding alliance. Based on the uncertainty AHP, appropriate improvements are made. Practical data have been employed, and the results indi- cate that this allocation method matches each member＇ s position in the alliance, which may make it more stable.

关 键 词：SHAPLEY值法 不确定型层次分析法(AHP) 投标联合体 贡献度 利益分配 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]