基于静态和动态纳什均衡的我国稀土出口价格分析  

Analysis of China's rare earth export price based on static and dynamic Nash equilibriums

作　　者：张晓青[1] 毛克贞[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西理工大学外语外贸学院,江西赣州341000

出　　处：《有色金属科学与工程》2012年第4期91-93,共3页Nonferrous Metals Science and Engineering

基　　金：国家社科基金重点项目(11AJL006);国家社科基金项目(12BJY137)

摘　　要：通过引入博弈论纳什均衡的分析方法,指出近些年由于企业的无序竞争,我国稀土出口价格出现不合理和不稳定状态,使企业和行业处在博弈论中的"囚徒困境"中.从维持稀土产品价格的合理和稳定的角度来研究,建立了稀土企业间静态非合作的纳什均衡解模型和稀土企业合作竞争时的动态最优价模型,求解得出了稀土企业间静态非合作的纳什均衡解和稀土企业合作竞争时最优价纳什均衡等结果,并得出结论,认为通过政府的产业政策和企业自律,我国稀土出口价格的合理和稳定是可以实现的.The export price of rare earth products has been in an unreasonable and unstable state in recent years due to the disorder competition of China＇s rare earth industry, which led rare earth producers and the whole industry to the ＂Prisoner＇s dilemma＂ in terms of Nash equilibrium in game theory. The Nash equilibrium solution model when rare earth companies are in static and non-cooperative state and the dynamic and optimal price model when rare earth companies are in the state of cooperative competition are established from the viewpoint of sustaining rational and stable rare price. Both static and dynamic Nash equilibrium solutions are calculated out of the two models. We conclude that China＇s rare earths export prices can be maintained at a reasonable and stable range with industrial polices by government and the self-discipline of rare earth producers.

关 键 词：稀土 出口价格 合作自律 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F752.62[经济管理—国际贸易]