上市公司中小投资者权益保护制度绩效的实证检验  

Test on the Rights and Interests Protection System Effect of the Minority Investor of China's Listed Companies

作　　者：危兆宾[1] 郭红卫[2] 

机构地区：[1]东莞理工学院城市学院 [2]长沙学院公共管理系

出　　处：《财务与金融》2012年第4期53-56,共4页Accounting and Finance

摘　　要：我国上市公司终极控股股东利用对上市公司的控制权,普遍通过非公平关联交易、违规信息披露、市场操纵等方式获取控制权私人收益,非法侵害中小投资者的合法权益。从上市公司股权结构等角度,通过逻辑回归分析,分别对股权分置改革时期、后股权分置时期中国上市公司中小投资者权益保护制度的绩效进行实证检验,这为制定保护中小投资者权益的政策提供了实证依据。] The ultimate controlling shareholders of listed companies in China use the control of listed companies,obtain pri- vate benefits of control and illegal infringement of the legitimate rights and interests of minority shareholders generally by unfair connected transactions, violations of information disclosure, market manipulation and other means. From the point of view of the equity structure of listed companies, this article respectively discuss the empirical performance of the rights and interests protection system effect of the minority investors of China＇s listed Companies during the split share structure reform period and post-split share structure reform period by the logistic return method. It provides the empirical evidence for the development of protection policy for the minority investors.

关 键 词：终极控股股东 非公平关联交易 股权分置改革 制度绩效 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]