制度变迁中财政支农资金低效锁定研究  

Research on the Inefficient Locking of Fiscal Fund for Assisting Agriculture over Institutional Change

作　　者：钟德仁[1] 梁俊凤[2] 王茜[2] 郝渊晓[2] 

机构地区：[1]安徽科技学院,安徽凤阳233100 [2]西安交通大学,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《财经论丛》2012年第4期27-33,共7页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：安徽省人文社会科学基金项目(2009sk434)

摘　　要：我国财政支农资金制度的改革和变迁,带有明显的中央集权和路径依赖特征,是中央、地方政府及农民三者之间利益博弈过程。因此,以制度变迁理论为依托,强化中央政府在财政支农资金制度创新的作用,重视地方政府的"主体地位"和壮大农民组织利益集团,实现财政支农资金效益的跃升,这是财政支农资金低效理论研究不可或缺的视角。The reform and change of fiscal？ fund？ system for assisting agriculture in China have the distinct features of centralization and path dependence, it is the game process between the central government, local governments and peasants. So, under the guideline of the theory of institutional change, it is to strengthen the mastery reaction of central government in institution innovation, to attach great importance to the subject position？ of local government, to strengthen the interest group of peasant organization, and to bring about the benefit ascent of fiscal fund for assisting agriculture. It is a fundamental angle of view on the theoretical？ study about low efficient？ of fiscal fund for assisting agriculture.

关 键 词：财政支农资金 制度变迁 利益博弈 制度创新 

分 类 号：F812.2[经济管理—财政学]